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Abstract: 
 
This study maps-out the variation in quality of government (‘QoG’ - e.g. low levels or 
corruption, protection of the rule of law, government effectiveness and accountability) 
for the national and regional level in the 27 EU countries. We begin with a national level 
assessment of QoG in the EU, elucidating the three significantly different cluster 
groupings of states that emerge using existing data from the World Bank. We then 
present a novel sub-national-level data for 172 EU regions based on a survey of 34,000 
residents across 18 countries, which constitutes the largest multi-country survey on QoG 
at the regional level to date.  We combine the two measures to conduct a large multi-
level assessment of QoG in Europe. The paper shows, first, that there are notable 
differences in the level of quality of government across EU regions; second, that those 
differences, despite being inherently difficult to capture, can be measured with sufficient 
accuracy and are resistant to the most stringent robustness checks available; third, that 
those differences in quality of government are highly correlated with the available 
indicators of differences in socio-economic development of EU regions.  
 
 
 
 
Nicholas Charron 
The Quality of Government Institute 
Department of Political Science 
University of Gothenburg 
nicholas.charron@pol.gu.se  
 
 
Lewis Dijkstra 
European Commission 
DG Regional Policy 
lewis.dijkstra@ec.europa.eu   
Victor Lapuente 
The Quality of Government Institute 
Department of Political Science 
University of Gothenburg 
victor.lapuente@pol.gu.se   
 2
1. Introduction: Why study quality of government in Europe? 
During the latest two decades, numerous studies have indicated that “quality of 
government” is a major determinant of many variables associated with the well-being of 
individuals within a country. This literature emphasizes the importance of how a 
government delivers its policies, instead of what a government delivers – that is, the size 
or “quantity” of government. Quality of government scholars deal with the extent to 
which a government delivers its policies – irrespective of their nature and degree or 
provision – in an effective way and without corruption. Evidence of such attention can be 
found not only in the rise of academic publications with a focus on this topic along with 
the interest from international organizations (IO’s) such as the World Bank and the 
United Nations, which have increasingly underlined the value of good governance and 
sound institutions from a development perspective (Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi 
2008). 
This has in turn given rise to a recent surge in new data creation, quantifying 
aspects of quality of government, and, in particular, its most measurable components 
(even if the measures are subjective or perception-based), such as the lack/control of 
corruption, the strength of the rule of law and bureaucratic quality or government 
effectiveness. There is such a high correlation amongst these cross-country indicators that 
comparative scholars have coined the term “quality of government” (QoG) to encapsulate 
the concept of a government that it is impartial, efficient and non-corrupt (Rothstein and 
Teorell 2008). Countries with high QoG score higher in almost all dimensions related to 
the welfare of their citizens (Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi 2009). QoG has been 
found – in an extensive and growing literature –to lead, among other, to better economic 
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performance (Knack and Keefer 1995, Mauro 1995, Mo 2001), higher environmental 
sustainability (Morse 2006, Welsch 2004), lower income inequality and poverty (Gupta, 
Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme 2002), better education and health outcomes (Mauro 1998; 
Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme 1998), higher levels of subjective happiness (Frey 
and Stutzer 2000; Helliwell 2003), and lower probabilities of civil armed conflict (Öberg 
and Melander 2005). 
Despite the importance of these findings, most data and research related to QoG 
has focused exclusively on the national level, with a particular focus on developing 
countries. This study focuses exclusively on the 27 Member States of the European 
Union, arguably all moderately to highly developed countries, yet, at the same time, these 
countries present noticeable differences in QoG. As a matter of fact, the European 
Commission has said that improvements in institutional capacity can foster and growth.  
“Strengthening institutional and administrative capacity can underpin structural 
adjustments and foster growth and jobs - and in turn significantly improve the quality of 
public expenditure.” (European Commission 2010).  The context of the crisis has further 
highlighted the need to focus on the quality of public expenditure as the quantity in many 
Member States will have to be reduced due to fiscal consolidation. As the notable within-
EU variations in QoG – at both national and regional level – shown in this study indicate, 
European policy-makers’ are rightly concerned with institutional and administrative 
capacity as the quality of public expenditure is probably lower in the EU countries and 
regions with lower QoG.  
Along with presenting national-level estimates, this study presents the largest 
survey on QoG at sub-national level (with around 34,000 respondents) up to date. By 
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combining these survey results with the existing national level data by the World Bank 
(Kaufmann et al 2009), the paper creates with a higher level of reliability than previous 
efforts in the literature a map of QoG in Europe, covering the variations across 27 
countries and 172 EU regions.   
 The main findings of the paper are the following. First, with the help of the new 
EU QoG data discussed in the subsequent sections (‘e.g. the ‘EU-QoG Index’), we find 
that there is significant variation in QoG across mainly three cluster groups of states: the 
top performers would mostly be from the Scandinavian, Germanic and English speaking 
countries; a second group would largely be formed by Mediterranean countries together 
with Estonia and Slovenia; and the third group would consists of most New Member 
States plus, notably, Italy and Greece.  
However these differences at national level could offer a relatively distorted 
picture of QoG in Europe in presence of significant sub-national variations in QoG. 
Previous literature has pointed out in that direction. For example, differences between 
Northern and Southern Italy are widely known thanks to several influential works (e.g. 
Putnam 1993), and the divergences between Flanders and Wallonia in Belgium are often 
debated. Yet such regional differences in QoG in these two countries - and several others 
- have not been quantified throughout the EU with comparable, cross-country data. The 
data presented in this paper is thus a pioneering effort to corroborate within-country QoG 
variations in most European countries simultaneously.  
In addition, the EU QoG Index at regional level developed here reveals that sub-
national variation in QoG is not empirically linked – at least, in a direct and obvious way 
– with the level of decentralization or the existence of a federalised system. For example, 
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even in a highly centralised country such as Romania, regions show significant 
differences among each other regarding policy implementation and the delivery of public 
services, which, nevertheless, are not decentralized to the regions. On the contrary, some 
federal states like Austria – where regions have real self-government capacities – show 
little internal variations. Conversely, both some highly fiscally and administratively 
decentralized countries like Denmark or Sweden and some highly centralized countries 
like Slovakia and Poland have no significant regional variation. In sum, the paper shows 
that sub-national differences in QoG are frequently as relevant as cross-country 
differences, while the latter are the focus of most the literature. Furthermore, it shows that 
that these regional divergences do not seem to obey to variations in levels of self-
government, which presents an intriguing question for future research.  
 The descriptive findings presented in this paper have some potential implications 
for both an academic audience as well as practitioners. Due to the limited scope of a 
paper and the complexity of a phenomenon with some many feedback effects and 
endogeneity issues among variables such as QoG (Rothstein 2010), we leave the 
important “why” questions outside the analysis. For instance, why decentralization leads 
to more homogeneous regional levels of QoG in some countries and to more 
heterogeneity in others? Which cultural legacies, economic variables or institutional 
factors may explain the notable regional differences on how the government delivers its 
policies? The data presented here can be of use for the scholars addressing this sort of 
questions fields such as comparative political economy, EU studies, decentralization and 
regional politics or comparative public administration. In addition, with regions playing 
such an important role in, for instance, the allocation of EU development funds, the data 
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presented here can serve as an initial tool of empirical assessment for practitioners 
interested in regional development policy and aid allocation.   
         The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  First, we begin the 
measurement of QoG within the EU with a national-level assessment, using existing data 
at the national level. Next, we describe the regional level survey undertaken in 172 EU 
regions from the largest 18 member states. Subsequently, we the combined national and 
regional QoG data into a QoG index for the entire EU Next, the paper deals with the 
external validity of the data by showing how the EU-QoG index correlates with several 
salient socio-economic variables and concludes with several suggestions of important 
empirical puzzles that could be addressed in the future using this new data. 
 
2. Measuring QoG at the national level        
According to the contemporary, national-level data, most indicators demonstrate that 
QoG, or ‘good governance’ is generally higher on average within the EU-27 member 
states as compared with other world regions.  A closer look however, reveals that there is 
significant variation among many of the countries in the EU. We can see this by 
analyzing current World Bank governance data and with the help of cluster analysis.  
Furthermore, we suspect that additional variation will be found within several countries 
that the national level indicators overlook.   
However, a serious obstacle to understanding more fully the presence (or absence) 
of QoG variation within-countries and the different challenges faced by the many regions 
within the Union stems from a lack of available data. The paper attempts to make a 
pioneering empirical step in overcoming the lack of data at the sub-national level. We 
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construct a QoG index for 181 political units (both national and regional level) in the EU, 
which aptly captures this variation for 172 NUTS 1 and NUTS 2 regions (e.g. 
Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) in 18 EU member states , along with 
comparable national level estimates for the 9 remaining member states which were not 
included in the regional survey.  As is the case in most of the cross-national QoG data, 
our regional level data is built on perceptions of QoG.  Hence, we combine the national 
level data – provided mainly by international investment firms and NGO’s - with the 
regional-level data, based on the opinions of the citizens, the consumers of QoG in this 
case.   
       The first step consists of analyzing the existing national-level data on QoG in 
Europe. While no comparable QoG indicators exist at the regional level within Europe, 
fortunately there are several national-level sources of data.  Upon thorough review of all 
available indicators for the countries in the EU 27, we find that the World Bank’s ‘World 
Governance Indicators’ (WGI) (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2009 – henceforth 
‘KKM’) data would be the most appropriate source on which to build an indicator of 
QoG for EU countries.  First, as opposed to only focusing on one particular concept of 
QoG, such as corruption, it covers four main, inter-related ‘pillars’ of QoG that we find to 
be highly salient: 
1. Control of Corruption 
2. Rule of Law  
3. Government Effectiveness  
4. Voice & Accountability   
    
Second, the WGI covers all EU countries for at least 10 years, going back to the 
mid 1990’s, and is now published annually each year.  Third, it is a ‘composite index’ 
and it is transparent in the way that it is constructed – publishing freely all underlying 
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data on which it is built, along with a relatively clear description of the conceptual 
meaning of each concept and the methodology used to create each variable.  Fourth, the 
theoretical scope of each QoG concept is wide rather than narrow.  We believe that unless 
specified, all aspects of corruption, rule of law, etc. should be included rather than 
focusing on narrow aspects alone.  This allows for more information to be included 
which is good for reliability checks of the data for example. 
        As far as the underlying data indicators are concerned, the number of sources varies 
from country to country in the dataset covering all countries in the world (some small 
island states have only one source for example for a given pillar while some states have 
more than 15).  However, the advantage of the EU sample is that there are at least 9 
common sources for each individual data indicator of QoG for the WGI, and in the case 
of Rule of Law (RL), there are at least 12 for all countries1.  The sources of the 
underlying data are mainly from ‘risk assessment’ institutes or ‘expert’ surveys, yet they 
do also contain NGO assessments such as Reporters Sans Frontiers and Freedom House, 
along with data from government agencies and citizen-based survey data, such as Gallop 
World Poll2. 
     We ranked the 27 EU countries according to each of the 4 areas of QoG listed above.  
All underlying data for the WGI, along with the weighting schemes use by KKM, are 
available freely online3. However, we were uncertain about the robustness of the data.  
Thus we took all data used to construct these four QoG indices for the year 2008, 
replicated the original results, and conducted extensive sensitivity tests and 
                                                 
1 The exception here is Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta, for which some sources were missing.   
2 For a full description of the WGI composite indicators, their construction and underlying data, see 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009).   
3 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp  
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internal/external consistency checks on each of the four areas of QoG.  After running a 
total of 264 simulations, whereby we altered the original weighting scheme, aggregation 
method and removing individual data sources one at a time, we found the data to be 
remarkably robust to changes, along with being strongly internally consistent4.  After 
confirming the robustness of the original estimates for each of the 4 composite indices, 
we then combined the 4 indices to create a combined, national-level ‘QoG index’.  The 
results of which can be seen in Table 1.    
***Table 1 about here*** 
We used cluster analysis to assess the national level variance in QoG across EU 
countries.  According to the WGI’s own margins of error, QoG differences between 
countries like Denmark and Finland, or Czech Republic and Hungary are 
indistinguishable.  The cluster groupings can therefore serve as a helpful tool to identify 
EU member states that share common challenges to building QoG at the national level.  
We employed hierarchical clustering using Ward’s method and squared Euclidian 
distancing for the four pillars of QoG to identify the number of appropriate cluster 
groupings.  Three distinct groups were detected in the analysis.  We then used k-means 
clustering with squared Euclidian distancing to assign each country to a cluster.  The 
results show mainly that with some exceptions, there are certainly geographic and 
historic similarities to the countries within each group. 
***Table 2 about here*** 
Without claiming that these groups are ‘etched in stone’, the data tell us that cluster 1 
countries exhibit significantly the highest levels of QoG in Europe, while cluster 2 and 
cluster 3 show, respectively, a moderate and low performance in QoG. According to this 
                                                 
4 For a more in depth look at the results of the sensitivity test, please see Charron (2010). 
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picture based on aggregate national data, there thus seems to be three Europes with 
respect to QoG: a first one with top performers mostly from Scandinavian, Germanic and 
Anglo-Saxon countries; a second one with most Mediterranean countries plus the two 
best performers in Central-Eastern Europe (Estonia and Slovenia); and a third one which 
would cover most post-communist EU members and, significantly, two Western 
European countries such as Italy and Greence.  
 
3. Measuring QoG at the Regional Level 
While certainly relevant as a starting point, the national level cluster groups do not tell 
the whole story.  National-level data has of course proliferated in recent years, yet 
measuring QoG at the regional level within most countries is ‘uncharted territory’, let 
alone measuring regional QoG across a number of states simultaneously.  Several recent 
surveys have been launched by Transparency International in Mexico and India to build 
measurements of citizen perceptions of corruption at the regional level.  However, in 
most countries, in particular those in the Europe, such data do not exist and those that do 
are more narrowly focused on capturing corruption, mostly in Italy (Del Monte and 
Papagni 2007; Golden and Picci 2005).     
In order to add to the necessary nuance to the national level, WGI data, we take 
advantage of data acquired for a large, EU Commission-funded project on measuring 
quality of government within the EU5.  We began with a survey of approximately 34,000 
EU citizens, which constitutes the largest survey ever undertaken to measure QoG at the 
sub-national level to date.  Then, a regional-level QoG index score for 172 NUTS 1 and 
                                                 
5 ‘Measuring Quality of Government and Sub-national Variation” Report for the EU Commission of Regional 
Development European Commission Directorate-General Regional Policy  Directorate Policy Development.  2010 
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NUTS 2 regions within 18 EU countries was built based on survey questions on citizen 
perception of QoG6.  As a compliment to national level QoG data, our citizen-based 
offers a source of information that is not subject to the common criticism that existing 
data is biased toward ‘business friendly’ environments (see Kurtz and Shrank 2007).   A 
more detailed description of the survey is located in the appendix.  
       In attempting to capture the most relevant sub-national variation in QoG possible, we 
focused exclusively on three public services that are most often financed, administered or 
politically accounted for by sub-national authorities.  These are education, health care and 
law enforcement.  While not perfect – regions in different countries have different 
administrative and fiscal responsibilities -, these are most often the public services that 
are most likely to be either administered or financed by regional governments (or both), 
thus maximizing regional variation where applicable.  We intentionally avoided questions 
about public areas such as defense or immigration as these are handled at the central 
level. We asked respondents to rate these three public services with respect to three 
related concepts of QoG – the quality, the impartiality and the level of corruption of said 
services. 
We acknowledge that some critics might argue that administrative and political 
responsibility of the regions varies in different countries and thus this is problematic.  We 
argue otherwise.  We seek to capture all regional variation within a country and as noted, 
the provision and quality of public services can vary within even a highly centralized 
country, for example if the distribution of public employees with a higher education is 
                                                 
6 NUTS 1 regions are from Germany, U.K., Sweden, Hungary, Greece, Netherlands and Belgium.  NUTS 2 
countries are Italy, Spain, Portugal, Denmark, Cz. Republic, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, France, 
and Austria. 
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highly skewed.  The complete survey can be found in the appendix.  The questions 
specifically used in building the QoG regional data are shown in the appendix.  
       Figure 1 shows the results of the regional QoG index for 172 EU regions. A quick 
examination of the data reveals fairly predictable patterns among the regions with respect 
to QoG.  All regions within the top performing EU members with regard to the national 
QoG index (Denmark, Sweden and Netherlands) are in the top 15% of all 172 regions.  
Among the NMS, all but one of regions are in the bottom 50% (i.e. have a score lower 
than ‘0’), with the only exceptions being Nord Vest (0.22) in Romania.  In contrast, most 
of the EU 15 regions are in the top 50%, with Portugal and Greece being the only 
exceptions having all of their respective regions under the mean average.  Moreover 
several of the regions in France and Italy are under the EU mean, with the later 
containing two in the bottom 10%.   
***Figure 1 about here***       
      As with the national-level data, we perform internal consistently checks and a 
sensitivity test to the index.  Chronbach’s Alpha correlation test, pairwise correlations 
and a principle component factor analysis demonstrate the data to be highly internally 
consistent7.  We performed 62 simulations in which the sensitivity of the data was tested 
using factor weights and geometric aggregation in addition to equal weighting and 
additive aggregation, while we removed each individual question as well as whole 
question-groups (e.g. all questions pertaining to ‘quality’, ‘impartiality’ or  ‘corruption’).  
In addition, for several simulations, we re-aggregated the data from the individual level 
whereby we excluded certain demographic groups, such as men, high income 
                                                 
7 Chronbach’s Alpha coefficient of reliability was 0.94, while 89% of the pairwise correlations among the 
16 questions were positive and significant.  The principle component analysis (PCA) demonstrated that the 
questions factored together according to QoG concepts of corruption, impartiality and quality.  
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respondents, young respondents, higher educated respondents and those who did not have 
any interaction with any of the public services in question within the last 12 months.  We 
found that even in the most extreme scenarios, the Spearman Rank Coefficient never fell 
below 0.90 and than the median shift in the rankings was never above 11. This shows that 
the regional data and scores are robust and internally consistency.  
 
4. Combining the Two Levels of Data - The EU QoG Index 
Although the entire sample of respondents in the regional level survey is large (34,000), 
the number of respondents per region is on the smaller side (200).  Thus we seek to add 
credible and robust observations to the regional level data to compensate for any outlying 
region or country in the regional survey.  To accomplish this – along with including the 
nine other EU countries in the sample (e.g. including those countries with only one 
NUTS 2 region, such as Estonia or Slovenia) - we elect to combine the WGI external 
assessment with our citizen-based, regional level data to create a comprehensive ‘EU 
QoG Index’.  Our aim was to come up with a method that mostly fairly includes the 
omitted EU countries from the survey while simulateneously maintinnig the richness of 
the within-country variation in several of the countries surveyed in the regional-level 
study.  In order to make the comparisons most meaningful, we employ the following 
formula to calculate each unit’s adjusted scores (whether regional or country): 
)( CountryYountryYregionXinCCountryY reCountryScoQoGScorecoreWBCountryS −+  
Where we essentially take the country average from the WGI data from Table 1, 
standardize it for the EU sample, and set each country’s mean score to that level.  For 
countries outside of the survey, there is nothing to add to the WGI Country score, thus 
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this national-level data is used as the QoG estimate alone, and regional variation is 
unobserved.  With respect to countries with the regional data, we set the national average 
using the WGI and explain the within-country variance using the regional-level data.  
Simply speaking, we aggregate the un-weighted, average regional QoG score (e.g. 
‘CountryScore CountryY ’) for each of the 18 countries in the survey and this is subtracted 
from each region’s individual score, which is then added to the national level data, so 
each region has an adjusted score, centred around the WGI.  We feel that this method 
makes best use of both national and regional data; combining our citizen survey with the 
opinions of the mainly expert, NGO and IGO data of the World Bank.  After calculating 
the scores for all of the regions, we then standardize them one more time, and the results 
of which are shown in Figure 2.   
       Although the national level data and regional level data are indeed directed at 
different levels of government – the WGI taps into the quality of national public sector, 
while the regional survey was explicitly asking respondents about their regional service – 
we argue that these two measures are indeed similar enough to combine.  First and most 
obviously, they are both capturing aspects of concepts such as corruption, quality of 
services, impartiality, and rule of law.  While the national data might be focused on 
several sectors of the national bureaucracy that are not measured by the regional level 
data – e.g. defence, immigration, etc. – we do not find this problematic.  While 
administrative and fiscal responsibilities vary from region to region in the EU, such areas 
of the public sector are out of the realm of all regional governments, thus it is most 
appropriate that we do not include them in any regional studies.  Second, the national 
averages to the WGI are robust, well-established, and internationally used measures, are 
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thus suited to estimate the country-level scores.  In adjusting the national level scores of 
the states, we sacrifice none of the rich sub-national variation from the regional level 
survey data.   
***Figure 2 about here*** 
Figure 2 shows the combined data between the WGI national-level QoG scores 
and the regional QoG data and Figure 3 shows the national averages with the within-
country range of sores.  A full list of scores for each region and country is located in the 
appendix.  The data show that 11 out of 15 EU-15 states have all their regions and/or 
national scores above the EU average, while all regional and national-level scores for the 
New Member States (NMS) are under the mean average8.  Three EU-15 countries – Italy, 
Spain and Portugal– contain regions that are both above and below the mean score, while 
Greece is the only EU-15 country to have all of its regions below the mean level of QoG 
in the EU.  Among the NMS, the Czech Republic has regional variation above and below 
the EU mean, while all others have all regions below the EU mean QoG score.    
   ***Figure 3 about here*** 
        For more useful comparisons across regions, we construct a margin of error at the 
95% confidence level.  This level equates to the probability that a margin of error around 
the reported QoG estimate for each region would include the "true" value of QoG or, in 
other words, that the margin of error tells us that we can say with about 95% confidence 
that a region’s estimate of QoG can be found within a plus/minus 1 margin of error9.  
                                                 
8 However, on specific combined pillars, such as RL or GE, several regions in the Czech Republic are 
above the EU mean score 
9 We know from basic statistical probability that in a sample ‘x’, 95% of the area of a basic normal Bell 
curve are between our estimate (µ) 1.96+/- the standard error around µ.  We calculate the standard error as: 
S.E. = 
n
σ . The margin of error for each individual region is based around the QoG estimate: 
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Three of the regions that showed the largest margins of error are Bucharesti (0.69), Sud 
Vest (0.55) and Galacia (0.52), which means that they all have a confidence interval that 
spans over a full standard deviation in the data due to relatively high/low scores 
compared with their final QoG regional index estimate.  The lowest margin of error 
belongs to the Polish region of Kujawsko-Pomorskie (0.166), meaning that we can be 
about 95% sure that the true estimate lies within a confidence interval of about one-third 
of a standard deviation around our current QoG estimate for this region.  Spanish regions 
on whole have high margins of error due to a general trend among respondents to rate 
their region very high with respect to impartiality questions, although relatively low 
regarding quality of services.  Danish and Polish regions on whole have the tightest 
confidence intervals.  All margin of errors around the regional estimates are found in the 
appendix.   
 
5. The Relevance of National and Within-Country Variation of QoG in the EU      
Based on the margins of error around the regional estimates, we are now prepared to 
make more meaningful comparisons of QoG in the EU. The data reveal several striking 
characteristics at first glance.  Using the margins of error for the estimates provided by 
the WGI for the country level data, we see that differences between pairs of countries like 
the Netherlands and Denmark, Belgium and Portugal, or Czech Republic and Poland are 
negligible.  However, in several countries, such as Italy, Spain, Belgium, Portugal, 
                                                                                                                                                 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−+
n
σ/96.1  with N = 16, because there are 16 indicators in the QoG index which have been 
aggregated from the survey data.  Each region thus has their own individual margin of error based on the 
consistency of the estimates for each of the 16 aggregated questions in the survey.  We end up with an 
average margin of error of 0.338, or about one third of a full standard deviation, with a minimum of 0.166 
to a maximum of 0.691. 
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France, Romania, Czech Republic and Bulgaria have multiple significantly different 
regions according to the regional-level margins of error while Greece, U.K., Poland, 
Hungary and Germany have one significant difference (e.g. the only significant within-
country different is between the high and low region).  The five other countries included 
in the regional survey showed no significant within-country QoG variation, meaning that 
all regions’ margins of error overlap.  
        Interestingly, the data show clearly that within-country QoG variation is at times 
equally or more important than cross-country variation.  For example, Figure 3 shows the 
rank-order of EU countries (again, using the WGI, national assessment as the country 
mean). For example, the gap between Bolzano (IT) to Campania (IT) in the data is much 
larger than then the gap of the national averages between Denmark and Portugal for 
example.  Further, while the national gap between Bulgaria and Romania at the national 
level is negligible from one another, their national scores are significantly lower than the 
national scores of other states such as Slovakia, Poland, Italy and Greece.  However the 
top region from each country (Nord Vest (RO11) in Romania and Severoiztochen (BG33) 
in Bulgaria are statistically indistinguishable from lower ranking regions within those 
other four countries.   
           In addition, what the data reveal is that for countries such as Denmark, Slovakia or 
Poland, national estimates (like the WGI) more or less capture aptly the level of QoG in 
the country; as there is such little within-country variation from region to region.  
However, in countries such as Belgium, Spain, Portugal, or Italy, the variation is quite 
significant, and thus the national-level data tend to overestimate poorer performing 
regions while underestimate better performing regions.   
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       Although mostly untested empirically due to a lack of empirical data at the regional 
level, several scholars have asserted that greater levels of decentralization lead to larger 
disparities from region to region with respect to variables such as bureaucratic quality or 
corruption in the public sector (Tanzi 1996, 2001; Brueckner 1999; Prud’homme 1995; 
Ghai and Regan 1992).  However, another striking feature of the data is that there appears 
to be no clear link between the level of decentralization and/or federalism and the amount 
of within-country variation of QoG.  Maybe unsurprisingly due to intentionally 
harmonized policy at the central level in many policy areas, federal countries like 
Germany and Austria demonstrate only moderate to low levels of within-country 
variation of QoG.  Yet Belgium has enormous variation between Flanders – which 
performs on par with regions from Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands – and 
Wallonia and Brussels regions, which perform much closer to regions in France, Spain or 
Portugal according to the data.  Semi-federal states such as Italy or Spain also have wide 
within-country regional variation.  On decentralization, most measures show that 
countries like Sweden and Denmark are highly fiscally and administratively 
decentralized10, yet they demonstrate very little within-country variation among regions.   
       On the other hand, some highly centralized countries such as Romania and Bulgaria 
demonstrate fairly wide within-country variation, with a few aforementioned regions 
overlapping regions in Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Italy and Greece and others such as 
Severozepaden (BG31) and Bucharest (RO32) are found among the three lowest-ranking 
regions in Europe with respect to QoG.  Moreover, Portugal, another highly centralized 
county according to most measures, also displays high regional variation, while a 
                                                 
10 Treisman (2003) reports several indicators from the the IMF on fiscal decentrliazation, such as the 
percentage of sub-national revenues and expenditures as a proportion of total revenues and expenditures.  
Sweden and Denmark are the two most decentralized countries with respect to these measures.   
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centralized country like Slovakia has no significant sub-national variation.  This gives 
some credence to the hypotheses that within country QoG variation may also hinge on the 
distribution of quality employees and/or execution of policy and services as a federal 
structure.   
        The primary purpose of this study was to present the new data for scholars of the 
European Union, comparative politics and/ or decentralization and federalism, thus it is 
outside the scope of this article to put forth any casual mechanisms as to why such sub-
national variation exists in some countries while in others it is negligible.  However, 
based on the recent and growing empirical literature on national level QoG and its 
correlates, this sections presents some correlations between the newly created index and 
several salient socio-economic variables. This is both for the purpose of demonstrating 
external validity of the data and to show its potential usefulness to scholars interested in 
this field of research.  It is worth noting of course that until now, such regional-level QoG 
analyses were not possible to perform. 
        We keep this portion of the analysis as simple as possible reporting only 
correlations, but again, we do not attempt to offer comprehensive empirical analyses or 
theoretical explanations of the underlying causal mechanisms of these patterns here. 
There are intense debates in the literature on up to which extent QoG is the result or the 
cause of a large number of socio-economic and political factors (e.g. see Rothstein and 
Uslaner 2005 for an initial in-depth discussion of these issues and Rothstein 2010 for a 
more recent review). Therefore, a meaningful contribution to the literature on why some 
governments perform better than others which took into account all the potential 
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feedback and endogeneity problems would require more space – and a different focus –  
than what this paper can offer now. 
At the national level of study, much recent research has pointed to a broad scope 
of empirical correlates with factors that fit in the QoG framework, such as indicators of 
rule of law or corruption for example and we seek to show several of these well 
established empirical linkages here. First, scholars have consistently found a strong 
empirical connection between reaching a higher levels of economic development and 
higher levels of various measures of QoG (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2002, 
2004; Knack and Keefer 1995; Mauro 1995; Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi 2008).  
Moreover, several scholars have reported that higher levels of QoG are strongly related 
with lower levels of income inequality (Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme 2002).  
Furthermore, QoG variables are positively related with indicators of macro-level 
indicators of health in society (Mauro 1998; Gupta, Davoodi, and Alonso-Terme 1998; 
Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasiritousi 2008). Other variables whose correlations with QoG  
we would like to explore are the regional population, its density and size of the 
geographical area of the region itself. Several studies have examined these factors – or 
equivalent ones – with, generally speaking, mixed results on their importance to explain 
differences in QoG (Knack and Azfar 2003; Alesina 2009).  Finally, we test the level of 
correlation between several indicators of technological development and QoG, as several 
studies have explored previously (Miller 2001; Kenny 2002).   
***Table 3 about here*** 
         Table 3 explores first a group of variables indicating size of a region – in terms of 
both area and population.  Interestingly, and although one could suspect these variables to 
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be related in some way with our perception-based measure of QoG, there is no significant 
correlation between measures of population, population density or area size and the EU 
QoG index.  In order to double-check the possibility of some correlations, we test the 
logged variables as well and find no significant result.   
Moving to indicators of development, table 3 shows that all such measures 
correlate at the 99% level of significance with QoG. We include standard indexes such as 
GDP per capita (measured in PPP, both logged and non-logged), two indicators of 
unemployment – the youth unemployment rate and the long-term unemployment rate – 
along with a Theil Index of regional-level wage inequality from Galbraith and Garcilazo 
(2005). QoG is associated with higher unemployment rates and higher levels of wage 
inequality in EU regions.  Finally, we find a strongly positive and significant correlation 
between QoG and an indicator or skilled labor - the percentage of the workforce that 
holds a tertiary level education (e.g. post-secondary training) or higher. 
         As regards to technology, we find that QoG is strongly correlated with the access to 
internet, aggregate-levels of households with computers along with the number of 
research and development (R&D) workers per capita in a region.  Finally, our measure of 
QoG is strongly (negatively) correlated with two standard proxies for the quality of 
health care for which data is available at regional level – the infant mortality rate and the 
number of heart disease deaths for the population under 65.   
 
7. Conclusions 
The data and analysis presented in this paper make the following contributions to the 
literature. First and foremost, the paper has mapped the differences in perceived levels of 
 22
quality of government among 172 EU regions based on the perception of citizens, which, 
in combination with the external, largely expert assessment of the national level data, 
represents the most encompassing data up to date on sub-national variation in corruption 
or good governance variables.  
The paper has found a notable amount of variation both between and within EU 
countries. On the former, the Northern European countries tend to show the highest levels 
of QoG, distinguishing themselves from two groups also statistically differentiable: a 
group encompassing most Southern-Mediterranean states and another group covering the 
majority of new member states that, with the exception of Estonia and Slovenia, present 
the lowest levels of QoG in the EU. On the later, significant within-country variations can 
be found in federal or semi-federal nations such as Italy, Belgium or Spain, but also, 
noticeably, in more centralized ones, such as Portugal, Romania or Bulgaria. Other 
countries, like Denmark, Poland, Austria or Slovakia show very little variation across 
regions.   
Although many more empirical relationships can be explored in future research, 
the basic correlation analysis showed that the QoG index is strongly correlated with 
crucial socio-economic variables such as GDP per capita, infant mortality rates, internet 
availability, or long-term unemployment, all of which play a vital role in the lives of EU 
citizens. Thus the data created here can serve many purposes ranging from policy-makers 
assigning regional development aid to scholars employing the data to test a number of 
hypotheses at the sub-national level of analysis on why in some regions governments 
seem to perform better than in others.  
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We would like to conclude by underscoring the importance of focusing on QoG 
not only in developing regions of the world but inside the EU. As this study has shown, 
still too many EU residents report to have first hand experience of corruption and 
discrimination and the share of residents confronted with these issues is far higher in 
some regions and countries. All in all, we have seen that QoG in the EU varies 
significantly between countries and between regions within these countries. Wherever it 
is low, it leads to stunted economic growth, blocked ambitions and sometimes shortened 
lives. Much remains to be done to achieve a uniformly high level of QoG in all regions of 
the EU. With much attention going to regional development from the EU Cohesion 
policy for example, the data and recommendations presented here can be a valuable 
policy tool for both practitioners and scholars alike interested in studying sub-national 
level development. We argue that a joint and targeted effort to improve QoG in those 
regions with lower levels could substantially improve the economic prospects of these 
regions and the lives of their residents. 
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Table 1: National Level Scores and Rankings of QoG in the EU 27 
QoG Rank Country Comb. WGI 
1 DENMARK 1.98 
2 SWEDEN 1.93 
3 FINLAND 1.91 
4 NETHERLANDS 1.83 
5 LUXEMBOURG 1.75 
6 AUSTRIA 1.71 
7 GERMANY 1.64 
8 U.K. 1.63 
9 IRELAND 1.6 
10 FRANCE 1.41 
11 BELGIUM 1.37 
12 MALTA 1.26 
13 SPAIN 1.12 
14 PORTUGAL 1.08 
15 CYPRUS 1.08 
16 ESTONIA 1.02 
17 SLOVENIA 0.96 
18 CZ. REPUBLIC 0.81 
19 HUNGARY 0.76 
20 SLOVAKIA 0.62 
21 LITHUANIA 0.58 
22 GREECE 0.57 
23 LATVIA 0.55 
24 POLAND 0.55 
25 ITALY 0.48 
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26 BULGARIA 0.08 
27 ROMANIA 0.04 
Note: ‘Comb. WGI’ shows the combined averages of the 4 pillars of QoG from the WGI.  It is standardized so that the 
world average is ‘0’ with a standard deviation of ‘1’.  QoG rank is within the EU countries only, thus Estonia for 
example is roughly one full standard deviation above the world average.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Clusters of EU Countries (ranking order) Based on 4 Areas 
of QoG 
             
Cluster 1   Cluster 2  Cluster 3     
n=9   n=8  n=10     
DENMARK  FRANCE   CZECH REPUBLIC   
SWEDEN   BELGIUM   LITHUANIA   
FINLAND   MALTA   HUNGARY   
NETHERLANDS  SPAIN   SLOVAKIA   
AUSTRIA   PORTUGAL  POLAND    
GERMANY  CYPRUS   LATVIA    
UNITED KINGDOM  ESTONIA   GREECE    
IRELAND   SLOVENIA   ITALY    
LUXEMBOURG     BULGARIA   
       ROMANIA    
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Table 3: Correlates of the EU QoG Index   
     
 Demographic & Development Technology Health  
  Region Characteristics Indicators Indicators Indicators 
Population 0.09    
pop. (Log) 0.004    
Pop. Density 0.08    
Area 0.06    
Capital region -0.05    
EU 15 0.59***    
     
PPP per cap. .59***   
PPPp.c. (Log) .65***   
Youth unemployment -.66***   
L.T. unemployment (24-65) -.31***   
Income inequality -.52***   
% Tertiary Education .61***   
     
% Internet  0.78***  
% R&D workers  0.68***  
% no computer  -0.80***  
 
Infant Mortality rate   -0.58*** 
Heart Disease Deaths     -0.66*** 
Note: Person-pairwise correlations reported.  ‘GDP p.c.’ is the purchasing power standard (current market value, 10-
year average). ‘L.T. Unemployment 24-65 ’  is the long term unemployment rate for people between the ages of 24 and 
65.  %Tertiary Education is the percentage of the workforce with a tertiary education or higher.  ‘% R&D‘ is the 
percentage of research and development workers in the region/country.  ‘Infant mort’ rates are measured as the number 
of infant mortality deaths per 10,000 . ‘%internet’ is the percentage of people with access to internet at home.   
Population is the log of the total population. Heart Disease Deaths is the standardised death rate from heart disease for 
population under 65, 2006-2008.  All data taken from Eurostat is averaged over a 10-year period (1999-2008).   
*** p<.01,  
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Figure 1: The Regional Level Data 
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Figure 2: The EU QoG Index 
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Appendix 1: description of Sub-National survey and data construction 
The EU regional survey was undertaken between 15, December, 2009 and 1 February, 
2010 by Efficience 3, a French market-research, survey company.  The respondents, 
ranging from 18 years of age or older, were contacted randomly via telephone in the local 
language by the ‘birthday method’ with replacement.  As Longstreth, and Shields (2009) 
find, although not as demographically representative as the ‘quota method’, the birthday 
method obtains a reasonably representative sample of the population while providing a 
better distribution of opinion. 
         In trying to capture any regional variation within a country, we asked 34 QoG and 
demographic based questions to the approximately 200 respondents per NUTS region.  
Regarding the QoG questions, the respondents were asked about three general public 
services in their regions – education, health care and law enforcement.  Publically 
administered areas such as immigration, customs or national security were intentionally 
avoided because these are dealt with at the national or even supranational level.  In 
focusing on these three services, we asked respondents to rate their public services with 
respect to three related concepts of QoG – the quality, impartiality and level of 
corruption of said services 11.  In addition we included two further questions in the index 
– one about the fairness of regional elections and the other about the strength and 
effectiveness of the media in the region to expose corruption.   
        In constructing the regional level data, we followed the advice of the “Handbook on 
Constructing Composite Indicators” (2008) from the OECD and JRC.  After many 
internal consistency checks and tests at both the individual and aggregate regional levels, 
we ran correlations and factor analysis and determined 16 of the survey questions on 
QoG would be used to build the regional QoG index.  For the sake of simplicity and 
easier replication, we first standardize each question12 and aggregated the individual-level 
responses to the regional level, taking the simple mean.  To combine the 16 questions 
into one index for each region, we used equal weighting and arithmetic aggregation.  We 
standardize the data so that the mean is ‘0’ with a standard deviation of ‘1’.   
 
 
                                                 
11 These are related concepts which have come up frequently in the comparative QoG literature, thus we try 
to include citizens’ opinion regarding all three, for more, see Holmberg, Rothstein and Nasturosi (2009).   
12 Questions are standardized due variations in the range of response (i.e. ‘0-10’, ‘0-4’, ‘yes/no’, etc.) 
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Survey Questions Incorporated in the Regional QoG Index 
Rule of Law-Focused Questions     
"How would you rate the quality of the police force in your area?" (low/high, 0-10)   
“The police force gives special advantages to certain people in my area.” (agree/disagree, 0-10)  
“All citizens are treated equally by the police force in my area”  (Agree, rather agree, rather disagree or Disagree, 1-4) 
“Corruption is prevalent in the police force in my area” (agree/disagree, 0-10)   
       
Government Effectiveness-focused questions     
"How would you rate the quality of public education in your area?" (low/high 0-10)   
"How would you rate the quality of the public health care system in your area?" (low/high 0-10)  
“Certain people are given special advantages in the public education system in my area (agree/disagree, 0-10) 
“Certain people are given special advantages in the public health care system in my area.” (agree/disagree, 0-10) 
“All citizens are treated equally in the public education system in my area” .” (Agree, rather agree, rather disagree or Disagree, 1-4) 
“All citizens are treated equally in the public health care system in my area” .” (Agree, rather agree, rather disagree or Disagree, 1-4)
       
Voice & Accountability-focused questions     
"In your opinion, if corruption by a public employee or politician were to occur in your area,  
how likely is it that such corruption would be exposed by the local mass media?" (unlikely/likely,  0-10) 
"Please respond to the following: Elections in my area are honest and clean from corruption" (agree/disagree, 0-10) 
       
Corruption-Focused Questions     
“Corruption is prevalent in my area’s local public school system (agree/disagree, 0-10)  
“Corruption is prevalent in the public health care system in my area” (agree/disagree, 0-10)  
"In the past 12 months have you or anyone living in your household paid a bribe in any form to:  
Health or medical services?" (yes/no)     
"In your opinion, how often do you think other citizens in your area use bribery to obtain public services?" (never/very often, 0-10) 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2: EU QoG Index with Margins of Error 
 
NUTS Code Region EU QoG Index S.E. min max 
AT11 AT_Burgenland 1.24521 0.184969 1.06024 1.430179
AT12 AT_Lower Austria 0.967728 0.210921 0.756808 1.178649
AT13 AT_Vienna 0.98951 0.24213 0.7473806 1.23164
AT21 AT_Carinthia 1.13204 0.260895 0.8711402 1.392931
AT22 AT_Styria 0.825754 0.203061 0.6226935 1.028815
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AT31 AT_Upper Austria 0.883877 0.170733 0.7131436 1.05461
AT32 AT_Salzburg 0.856572 0.211227 0.6453443 1.067799
AT33 AT_Tyrol 1.11136 0.255512 0.8558455 1.366869
AT34 AT_Vorarlberg 1.04341 0.249902 0.7935072 1.293311
BE1 BE_Brussels-Capital Region -0.018374 0.401287 -0.4196615 0.3829132
BE2 BE_Flemish Region 1.27242 0.467462 0.8049579 1.739882
BE3 BE_Walloon Region 0.337747 0.344849 -0.0071015 0.682596
BG31 BG_Severozapaden -2.46142 0.418835 -2.880258 -2.042588
BG32 BG_Severen tsentralen -1.96389 0.528717 -2.492604 -1.435171
BG33 BG_Severoiztochen -0.835811 0.255895 -1.091707 -0.5799159
BG34 BG_Yugoiztochen -2.04246 0.380321 -2.422776 -1.662135
BG41 BG_Yugozapaden -1.73656 0.358962 -2.09552 -1.377597
BG42 BG_Yuzhen tsentralen -1.00568 0.308359 -1.314036 -0.6973182
CYPRUS  CY_Cyprus -0.067572    
CZ01 CZ_Prague -0.847407 0.427903 -1.27531 -0.4195037
CZ02 CZ_Central Bohemian Region -0.17927 0.410925 -0.5901955 0.231655
CZ03 CZ_Jihozápad (Southwest) 0.032461 0.34583 -0.3133695 0.3782912
CZ04 CZ_Severozápad (Northwest) -0.853366 0.475445 -1.328811 -0.3779216
CZ05 CZ_Severovachod (Northeast) -0.066455 0.309828 -0.3762828 0.2433726
CZ06 CZ_Jihovachod (Southeast) -0.392497 0.331134 -0.7236311 -0.0613629
CZ07 CZ_Steední Morava (Central Moravia) -0.484559 0.375791 -0.8603498 -0.1087674
CZ08 CZ_Moravian-Silesian Region -0.314155 0.404391 -0.718546 0.0902364
DE1 DE_Baden-Württemberg 0.911664 0.306463 0.6052015 1.218127
DE2 DE_Bavaria 0.647061 0.332838 0.3142223 0.979899
DE3 DE_Berlin 0.911567 0.361154 0.5504135 1.27272
DE4 DE_Brandenburg 0.909683 0.377331 0.5323524 1.287014
DE5 DE_Bremen 0.884354 0.302349 0.5820053 1.186703
DE6 DE_Hamburg 0.892336 0.291172 0.6011639 1.183507
DE7 DE_Hessen 0.566761 0.269973 0.2967877 0.8367344
DE8 DE_Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 0.880592 0.287196 0.5933958 1.167788
DE9 DE_Lower Saxony 0.86861 0.29522 0.5733898 1.16383
DEA DE_North Rhine-Westphalia 0.649414 0.344624 0.3047904 0.9940374
DEB DE_Rhineland-Palatinate 0.759893 0.236555 0.5233378 0.9964481
DEC DE_Saarland 0.981332 0.326151 0.6551808 1.307482
DED DE_Saxony 1.02502 0.287063 0.7379615 1.312088
DEE  DE_Saxony-Anhalt 0.79844 0.343202 0.4552377 1.141641
DEF DE_Schleswig-Holstein 1.19937 0.350467 0.8489038 1.549838
DEG DE_Thuringia 1.26162 0.376833 0.8847875 1.638453
DK01 DK_Hovedstaden 1.32036 0.349469 0.9708959 1.669833
DK02 DK_Sjylland 1.46039 0.358202 1.102183 1.818587
DK03 DK_Syddanmark 1.45194 0.248999 1.202942 1.70094
DK04 DK_Midtjylland 1.69493 0.268246 1.426684 1.963176
DK05 DK_Nordjylland 1.3313 0.326877 1.004426 1.65818
ES11 ES_Galicia 0.413978 0.523689 -0.1097114 0.9376674
ES12 ES_Asturias 0.352286 0.482956 -0.1306693 0.8352418
ES13 ES_Cantabria -0.010656 0.453844 -0.4645002 0.4431877
ES21 ES_Basque Community 0.503343 0.396789 0.1065542 0.9001327
ES22 ES_Navarre 0.018516 0.340154 -0.3216378 0.3586697
ES23 ES_La Rioja 0.087531 0.51451 -0.4269791 0.6020418
ES24 ES_Aragon 0.163518 0.418101 -0.2545831 0.5816199
ES30 ES_Madrid -0.247973 0.475226 -0.7231987 0.2272536
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ES41 ES_Castile-Leon -0.205311 0.462443 -0.6677544 0.2571318
ES42 ES_Castile-La Mancha 0.053168 0.408007 -0.3548395 0.4611753
ES43 ES_Extremadura 0.257719 0.397725 -0.1400055 0.6554436
ES51 ES_Catalonia -0.608302 0.436637 -1.044939 -0.1716643
ES52 ES_Valencian Community -0.000401 0.414206 -0.4146074 0.4138049
ES53 ES_Balearic Islands -0.044622 0.428495 -0.4731168 0.3838732
ES61 ES_Andalusia -0.346923 0.428444 -0.7753667 0.0815213
ES62 ES_Region of Murcia 0.127813 0.439706 -0.3118933 0.5675184
ES70 ES_Canarias 0.116667 0.466744 -0.3500766 0.5834115
ESTONIA  EE_Estonia -0.101101    
FINLAND  FI_Finland 1.33853    
FR10 FR_ille de France 0.7194 0.372864 0.3465368 1.092264
FR21 FR_Champagne-Ardenne 0.363253 0.339619 0.0236346 0.702872
FR22 FR_Picardie 0.644364 0.332997 0.3113667 0.9773604
FR23 FR_Haute-Normandie 0.302352 0.306406 -0.004054 0.6087576
FR24 FR_Centre 0.78493 0.29908 0.4858492 1.08401
FR25 FR_Basse-Normandie 0.675329 0.297824 0.3775054 0.9731534
FR26 FR_Bourgogne 0.658247 0.252689 0.405558 0.9109353
FR30 FR_Nord-Pas-de-Calais 0.716626 0.377446 0.3391806 1.094072
FR41 FR_Lorraine 0.42083 0.327582 0.0932472 0.7484118
FR42 FR_Alsace 0.648288 0.337382 0.3109058 0.9856696
FR43 FR_Franche-Comté 0.667755 0.366942 0.3008132 1.034697
FR51 FR_Pays de la Loire 0.532067 0.366698 0.1653692 0.8987653
FR52 FR_Bretagne 1.20801 0.339386 0.8686273 1.547399
FR53 FR_Poitou-Charentes 0.937234 0.345534 0.5917001 1.282768
FR61 FR_Aquitaine 0.987978 0.30657 0.6814072 1.294548
FR62 FR_Midi-Pyrénées 0.569131 0.276197 0.2929332 0.845328
FR63 FR_Limousin 0.896629 0.265082 0.631547 1.161711
FR71 FR_Rh?ne-Alpes 0.968226 0.288534 0.6796925 1.25676
FR72 FR_Auvergne 0.735153 0.345592 0.3895617 1.080745
FR81 FR_Languedoc-Roussillon 0.709065 0.274919 0.4341463 0.9839847
FR82 FR_Provence-Alpes-Cote d'Azur 0.392791 0.26841 0.1243811 0.6612011
FR83 FR_Corse 0.302125 0.348368 -0.0462427 0.6504931
FR91 FR_Guadeloupe -0.405432 0.444371 -0.8498033 0.0389395
FR92 FR_Martinique -0.258243 0.409765 -0.6680079 0.1515225
FR93 FR_Guyane -0.367666 0.36722 -0.7348862 -0.0004456
FR94 FR_Réunion 0.017779 0.505115 -0.4873356 0.5228938
GR1 GR_Voreia Ellada -1.29738 0.46692 -1.764303 -0.8304621
GR2 GR_Kentriki Ellada -0.982346 0.558249 -1.540594 -0.4240971
GR3 GR_Attica -0.186338 0.540012 -0.7263497 0.3536738
GR4 GR_Nisia Aigaiou. Kriti -0.827893 0.473517 -1.301409 -0.354376
HU1 HU_Central Hungary -0.945973 0.381707 -1.32768 -0.5642668
HU2 HU_Transdanubia -0.257964 0.233217 -0.4911808 -0.0247468
HU3 HU_Great Plain and North -0.375622 0.227085 -0.6027073 -0.1485364
IRELAND  IE_Ireland 0.887834    
ITC1 IT_Piemonte -0.368537 0.24482 -0.6133572 -0.1237168
ITC2 IT_Valle d'Aosta 0.432878 0.246151 0.1867269 0.6790292
ITC3 IT_Liguria -0.751306 0.320646 -1.071952 -0.43066
ITC4 IT_Lombardia -0.880229 0.2162 -1.096429 -0.6640291
ITD1 IT_Trentino-Alto Adige(Bolzano) 0.566949 0.231172 0.3357767 0.7981205
ITD2 IT_Trentino-Alto Adige(Trento) 0.277559 0.271582 0.0059767 0.5491409
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ITD3 IT_Veneto -0.70753 0.257858 -0.9653881 -0.4496719
ITD4 IT_Friuli-Venezia Giulia -0.056537 0.207372 -0.2639094 0.1508352
ITD5 IT_Emilia-Romagna -0.588653 0.187148 -0.7758017 -0.4015051
ITE1 IT_Toscana -0.794426 0.244314 -1.03874 -0.5501121
ITE2 IT_Umbria -0.43929 0.301075 -0.740365 -0.1382146
ITE3 IT_Marche -0.705806 0.295703 -1.001509 -0.4101025
ITE4 IT_Lazio -1.5 0.261525 -1.761527 -1.238477
ITF1 IT_Abruzzo -1.147 0.341497 -1.4885 -0.8055063
ITF2 IT_Molise -1.46933 0.355858 -1.825192 -1.113477
ITF3 IT_Campania -2.53499 0.302063 -2.837054 -2.232928
ITF4 IT_Puglia -1.96074 0.326568 -2.287313 -1.634176
ITF5 IT_Basilicata -1.49184 0.310627 -1.802464 -1.181209
ITF6 IT_Calabria -2.40746 0.455613 -2.863074 -1.951847
ITG1 IT_Sicilia -2.05231 0.332418 -2.384724 -1.719888
ITG2 IT_Sardegna -1.12578 0.287538 -1.413323 -0.8382466
LATVIA  LV_Latvia -0.798874    
LITHUANIA  LT_Lithuania -0.866395    
LUXEMBOURG  LU_Luxembourg 1.12326    
MALTA  MT_Malta 0.333871    
NL1 NL_Northern Netherlands 1.5898 0.398223 1.191576 1.988022
NL2 NL_Eastern Netherlands 1.15034 0.35875 0.7915856 1.509085
NL3 NL_Western Netherlands 1.24352 0.330826 0.9126915 1.574342
NL4 NL_Southern Netherlands 1.05038 0.308493 0.7418913 1.358877
PL11 PL_Lodzkie -0.842786 0.238326 -1.081112 -0.6044596
PL12 PL_Mazowieckie -0.990314 0.209256 -1.19957 -0.781058
PL21 PL_Malopolskie -0.87108 0.237275 -1.108355 -0.6338055
PL22 PL_Slaskie -1.10748 0.184302 -1.291777 -0.9231743
PL31 PL_Lubelskie -0.900114 0.222066 -1.122181 -0.6780483
PL32 PL_Podkarpackie -0.848802 0.268723 -1.117525 -0.5800796
PL33 PL_Swietokrzyskie -0.801872 0.230502 -1.032374 -0.5713692
PL34 PL_Podlaskie -0.956682 0.201208 -1.15789 -0.7554749
PL41 PL_Wielkopolskie -0.99299 0.199638 -1.192627 -0.7933524
PL42 PL_Zachodniopomorskie -0.863354 0.206438 -1.069792 -0.6569154
PL43 PL_Lubuskie -0.924897 0.259652 -1.184549 -0.6652453
PL51 PL_Dolnoslaskie -1.10854 0.244496 -1.353037 -0.8640453
PL52 PL_Opolskie -0.610872 0.223744 -0.8346158 -0.3871286
PL61 PL_Kujawsko-Pomorskie -0.944576 0.166524 -1.1111 -0.7780519
PL62 PL_Warminsko-Mazurskie -0.667592 0.216398 -0.8839898 -0.4511934
PL63 PL_Pomorskie -0.854148 0.199281 -1.053429 -0.6548673
PT11 PT_Norte -0.408724 0.354227 -0.7629511 -0.0544967
PT15 PT_Algarve 0.113063 0.499507 -0.3864439 0.6125702
PT16 PT_Centro -0.120377 0.351323 -0.4717 0.2309451
PT17 PT_Lisboa  0.046795 0.386778 -0.3399833 0.4335736
PT18 PT_Alentejo 0.634629 0.379736 0.2548935 1.014365
PT20 PT_A?ores 0.411968 0.300869 0.111099 0.7128375
PT30 PT_Madeira 0.183354 0.40156 -0.2182058 0.5849143
RO11 RO_North-West -1.06156 0.450279 -1.511837 -0.611279
RO12 RO_Centru -1.50081 0.449526 -1.950336 -1.051284
RO21 RO_North-East -1.9268 0.549444 -2.476245 -1.377357
RO22 RO_South-East -1.94746 0.586293 -2.533751 -1.361166
RO31 RO_South-Muntenia -1.69116 0.484932 -2.176092 -1.206228
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RO32 RO_Bucharest-Ilfov -2.86201 0.691558 -3.553564 -2.170449
RO41 RO_South-West Oltenia -1.39932 0.551243 -1.950565 -0.8480803
RO42 RO_West -2.15954 0.54126 -2.700798 -1.618277
SE1 SE_East Sweden 1.42647 0.314589 1.111882 1.74106
SE2 SE_South Sweden 1.5027 0.35416 1.148538 1.856858
SE3 SE_North Sweden 1.31237 0.289996 1.022377 1.60237
SK01 SK_Bratislava Region -0.567789 0.292796 -0.8605855 -0.2749932
SK02 SK_Western Slovakia -0.855228 0.29755 -1.152777 -0.557678
SK03 SK_Central Slovakia -0.759113 0.240277 -0.9993902 -0.5188364
SK04 SK_Eastern Slovakia -0.762255 0.248696 -1.010951 -0.5135587
SLOVENIA  SI_Slovenia -0.187761    
UKC UK_North East. England 0.92786 0.351728 0.5761324 1.279589
UKD UK_North West. England 1.04718 0.371567 0.675608 1.418742
UKE UK_Yorkshire and the Humber. Eng. 0.665006 0.314432 0.3505737 0.9794381
UKF UK_East Midlands. England 1.24916 0.325304 0.9238572 1.574466
UKG UK_West Midlands. England 0.810369 0.241009 0.56936 1.051378
UKH UK_East of England 0.774739 0.292132 0.4826076 1.066871
UKI UK_London. England 0.499582 0.252649 0.2469333 0.7522308
UKJ UK_South East. England 1.0888 0.343859 0.7449377 1.432656
UKK UK_South West. England 1.09708 0.348747 0.7483323 1.445826
UKL UK_Wales 0.816926 0.350293 0.4666334 1.16722
UKM UK_Scotland 1.2807 0.379889 0.9008119 1.660591
UKN UK_Northern Ireland 0.94216 0.415778 0.5263812 1.357938
 
 
 
